Secure Energy Harvesting Communications with Relay Selection over Nakagami-m Fading Channels by Yin, Cheng et al.
Secure Energy Harvesting Communications with Relay Selection over
Nakagami-m Fading Channels
Yin, C., Nguyen, P., Garcia-Palacios, F., Tran, X., & Le-Tien, T. (2017). Secure Energy Harvesting
Communications with Relay Selection over Nakagami-m Fading Channels. Mobile Networks and Applications, 1-
8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11036-017-0919-5
Published in:
Mobile Networks and Applications
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2017 Springer Verlag. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:05. Apr. 2019
FO
R A
PP
RO
VA
L
Mobile Netw Appl
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11036-017-0919-5
Secure Energy Harvesting Communications with Relay
Selection over Nakagami-m Fading Channels
Cheng Yin1 · Nam-Phong Nguyen1 · Emiliano Garcia-Palacios1 · Xuan Nam Tran2 ·
Thuong Le-Tien3
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017
Abstract In this paper, an energy harvesting relay network
over Nakagami-m fading is investigated. In the considered
system, the power beacon can provide wireless energy for
the source and relays which deploy time-switching-based
radio frequency energy harvesting technique. Two relay
selection schemes, namely partial relay selection and opti-
mal relay selection, are proposed in order to enhance the
system performance. In the former, the source only has
the channel state information of the first hop, while in
the latter it has the full knowledge of the channel state
information. The eavesdropper is able to wiretap to the sig-
nal transmitted from the source and the relays. The exact
closed-form expressions of secrecy outage probability are
derived. The results show that optimal relay selection per-
forms better than partial relay selection. With increasing
number of relays, the considered system shows better per-
formance. In addition, the energy harvesting duration has a
significant effect on the secrecy outage probability.
Keywords Physical layer security · Energy harvesting ·
Relay networks · Nakagami-m Fading
 Nam-Phong Nguyen
pnguyen04@qub.ac.uk
1 Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
2 Le Quy Don Technical University, Hanoi, Vietnam
3 Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology, Ho Chi Minh
City, Vietnam
1 Introduction
Consuming energy in human’s activities is one of the most
significant reasons that lead to climate changes. Besides, the
booming of wireless communication keeps increasing the
number of mobile devices and base stations which cause a
huge amount of carbon emission. Therefore, a more sustain-
able wireless network is one of the most urgent missions
of wireless communication. Lately, radio frequency (RF)
energy harvesting (EH) has attracted wide attention from
the research community as a promising solution [1–3]. This
technology can enable mobile devices to harvest the RF
signals in the surrounding environment and charge their
batteries. It also allows energy constrained devices, i.e.,
wireless sensor nodes, prolong their lifetime while replac-
ing or recharging their batteries is troublesome. In [4],
the authors proposed theoretical power splitting schemes,
i.e., time switching (TS), static power splitting (SPS), and
on-off power splitting (OPS). The authors in [5] applied
time switching-based relaying (TSR) protocol and power
splitting-based relaying (PSR) protocol for relay networks.
In [6], the application of TSR EH in a cooperative commu-
nication system was studied. In [7], the comparison between
the best EH relay selection and the best information trans-
mission relay selection was carried out. The authors in [8]
examined a beamforming scheme in a multi-antenna full-
duplex relay network. In [9], an EH relay system with
multi-antenna power beacon was considered. The authors in
[10] considered an EH system consists of multiple antenna
BS, multiple single-antenna downlink and uplink users with
the assumption that the uplink users have to harvest energy
to transmit their information. A jointly beamforming and
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time allocating scheme that maximize the sum rate and
energy efficiency of the considered system were proposed.
Enhancing the coverage of wireless networks is also an
important aspect. Deploying higher transmit power at base
stations can increase both the coverage and unwanted inter-
ference. The relay network is a solution for this problem
since information can be transmitted from the transmit-
ter to its destination with the help of one or some relay
nodes. There are two well-known techniques deployed at
relay nodes, i.e., amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-
and-forward (DF) [11]. In AF technique, the received signal
at relays will be amplified and then transmitted to the
next destination. Meanwhile, in DF technique, the signal is
decoded first and then it is re-encoded before being trans-
mitted to the next destination. In relay networks, sometimes,
the link between the source and the relay node or the relay
node to the destination experiences heavy fading or shadow-
ing. One of the possible ways to enhance the performance of
the system in this situation is to deploy multiple relay nodes
and exploit the cooperative diversity of the network. Relay
selection is a promising cooperative diversity method due to
its low-complexity and high-efficiency. It has been proven
that relay selection can offer full diversity order for AF and
DF relay networks [12, 13].
One of the most significant problems of wireless net-
works is to secure information. Because of the broadcast
nature of wireless networks, confidential information is
vulnerable to malicious attacks. The traditional method to
protect confidential information over wireless networks is
to use upper layer cryptographic techniques. However, due
to the rapid development in computing, traditional cryp-
tographic techniques are no longer certain. It is urgent
to develop new secure methods to aid the traditional
ones. Recently, physical layer security (PLS) has gained
widespread attention as an additional protecting layer of
the wireless networks against eavesdroppers, alongside tra-
ditional cryptographic techniques. The principle of this
technique is that the randomness of the wireless channels
can be exploited to defend from eavesdroppers. The perfor-
mance of PLS in relay networks has been well-investigated
in the literature [14–26]. Recently, there have been studies
on PLS for EH networks. In [27], the secrecy performance
of EH system in which, wireless information and power
are transferred concurrently was considered. A coopera-
tive jamming scheme of an EH multi-antenna jammer was
studied in [28]. In [20], the authors studied the secrecy per-
formance of a wireless powered relay networks with aiding
power beacon over Rayleigh fading channels. Nevertheless,
the secrecy performance of EH relay networks has not been
well investigated.
In this paper, the secrecy performance of a wireless pow-
ered relay networks with cooperating power beacon over
Nakagami-m fading channels is investigated.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as fol-
lows:
• Two relay selection protocols, i.e., optimal relay selec-
tion (ORS) and partial relay selection (PRS), are pro-
posed to secure EH relay networks.
• The exact-closed form expressions of secrecy outage
probability (SOP) for two relay selection protocols are
derived.
• The results have shown that ORS scheme outperforms
PRS scheme. Besides, increasing the number of relays
significantly enhances the security performance of the
considered system. In addition, the EH duration shows
a huge effect on the SOP of the considered system and
should be carefully designed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. System
and channel models are described in Section 2. Performance
analysis with exact closed-form expressions is developed in
Section 3, while numerical results based on Monte-Carlo
simulations to validate the correctness of our analyses are
presented in section 4. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 5.
2 System and channel models
We consider an energy harvesting network consisting of a
power beacon B , an information source S, K DF relays
Rk , k = {1, ..., K}, a destination D and an eavesdropper
E , as shown in Fig. 1. The power beacon B, S, Rk , E,
and D are equipped with single antenna.The additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Rk and D has zero mean and
variance N0. Assuming all the channels are Nakagami-m
fading, and the channel power gains |hX|2 are gamma dis-
tributed with mean power λX, and severity parameters mX,
where X ∈ {SR, SE,BS,BR,RE,RD}. The cumulative
distribution function (CDF) and probability function (PDF)
of |hX|2 can be written as [29]
FX (x) = 1 − exp
(
− x
θX
) mX−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
x
θX
)i
, (1)
fX (x) = x
mX−1
(mX)θ
mX
X
exp
(
− x
θX
)
. (2)
Where θX = λXmX , and (·, ·) is the incomplete gamma
function [30, Eq. (8.352.6)].
2.1 Energy harvesting scheme
In the proposed system, S and Rk can harvest energy from
B, and then transmit signals with the harvested energy. The
power beacon can provide wireless energy to S and Rk∗ ,
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Fig. 1 System model
where the Rk∗ is the selected aiding relay to forward infor-
mation. In the paper, TS policy based energy harvesting is
used, as shown in Fig. 2. In a transmission block time T , S
and Rk∗ harvest energy for αT seconds. Then both S → Rk∗
and Rk∗ → D transmissions spend (1 − α)T /2 equally to
forward information, where α is the EH time fraction and
0 < α < 1. Therefore, the harvested energy at S and Rk∗ are
ES = ηPBαT |hBS|2, (3)
ER = ηPBαT |hBRk∗ |2, (4)
where η is the efficiency coefficient and 0 < η < 1. PB is
the transmit power of power beacon B. |hBS|2 and |hBRk∗ |2
are channel links from power beacon B to source S and B to
selected aiding relay Rk∗ . Assuming the processing energy
at S and Rk∗ can be ignored. Therefore, the transmit power
of S and Rk∗ are
PS = 2ηPB|hBS|
2α
(1 − α) , (5)
PR = 2ηPB|hBRk∗ |
2α
(1 − α) . (6)
2.2 Security scenarios
In the considered system, E can eavesdrop information dur-
ing the S → Rk∗ and Rk∗ → D transmissions. We assume
that there is no direct link from B → E. Therefore, the
harvested energy at S and Rk∗ can not be disturbed in the
presence of E. DF technique and different code books are
used in order to enhance the performance of the considered
system. The secrecy capacity of the considered system is
written as
Cs = min(C1s , C2s), (7)
where C1s and C2s are the achievable secrecy rate of the first
hop and the second hop, they can be expressed as follows:
C1s = 1 − α2
[
log2
(
1 + γ1M
1 + γ1E
)]+
= 
[
log2
(
1 + γ1M
1 + γ1E
)]+
, (8)
C2s = 1 − α2
[
log2
(
1 + γ2M
1 + γ2E
)]+
= 
[
log2
(
1 + γ2M
1 + γ2E
)]+
, (9)
where  = 1−α2 accounts for the fact that during a block
time T , both the first hop and second hop spend (1−α)T /2
equally to forward information, and [x]+ = max(x, 0). γ1M
is the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) of the first link S → Rk∗ ,
γ2M is the SNR of the second link Rk∗ → D, γ1E is the SNR
at S → E and γ2E is the SNR at Rk∗ → E. The SNR of the
first hop γ1M is given as
γ1M = PS|hSRk∗ |
2
N0
= 2ηαPB|hBS|
2|hSRk∗ |2
N0(1 − α)
= ξγM|hBS|2|hSRk∗ |2, (10)
where γM = PBN0 , ξ =
2ηα
(1−α) , and |hSRk∗ |2 is the channel
power gain of S → Rk∗ link. Similarly, γ2M, γ1E, and γ2E
can be written as
γ2M = γMξ |hBRk∗ |2|hRk∗D|2, (11)
γ1E = γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2, (12)
γ2E = γEξ |hBRk |2|hRk∗E|2, (13)
where |hRk∗D|2, |hSE|2, and |hRk∗E|2 are the channel power
gains of Rk∗ → D, S → E, and Rk∗ → E links. γE = PBNE ,
and NE is the variance of the AWGN at E.
2.2.1 Partial relay selection (PRS)
In some networks, it is not possible to know the full knowl-
edge of channel state information (CSI) of all the links.
Therefore, in this paper, we first consider a PRS that only
Fig. 2 Time switching based
protocol
α Τ (1−α) Τ/2 (1−α) Τ/2
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need to know the CSI of the first hop S → Rk . The best link
is selected when the first hop has the maximum SNR, and
can be expressed as
k∗ = arg max
k=1,...,K
(|hSRk |2). (14)
Therefore, according to Eq. 14, the SNR of the first hop,
given by Eq. 10, can be rewritten as
γ1M = γMξ |hBS|2 max
k=1,...,K
(|hSRk∗ |2). (15)
The achievable secrecy rates of PRS scheme in the consid-
ered system is written as
CPRS = 
[
log2 min
(
1 + γMξ |hBS|2|hSRk∗ |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 ,
1 + γMξ |hBRk∗ |2|hRk∗D|2
1 + γEξ |hBRk∗ |2|hRk∗E|2
)]+
. (16)
2.2.2 Optimal relay selection (ORS)
Unlike PRS that only has part of CSI of the considered sys-
tem, in ORS scheme, we assume that S has full knowledge
of CSI of all the links. The aiding relay Rk∗ is chosen that
can help the system have the maximum secrecy capacity,
and can be expressed as
k∗ = arg max
k=1,...,K
[
min
(
1 + γMξ |hBS|2|hSRk |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 ,
1 + γMξ |hBRk |2|hRkD|2
1 + γEξ |hBRk |2|hRkE|2
)]
. (17)
The achievable secrecy rates of ORS scheme in the
considered system is written as
CORS = 
[
log2 max
k=1,...,K
[
min
(
1 + γMξ |hBS|2|hSRk |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 ,
1 + γMξ |hBRk |2|hRkD|2
1 + γEξ |hBRk |2|hRkE|2
)]]+
. (18)
3 Secrecy outage probability
In this section, the closed-form expressions of secrecy out-
age probability (SOP) for PRS and ORS schemes are pro-
vided in order to evaluate the security performance of the
considered system. In a communication system, the secu-
rity outage probability is defined by the probability that the
achievable secrecy rate is below a pre-defined threshold Rth,
and can be expressed as
P {C < Rth} = P {γ < β}
= FγPRS (β) , (19)
where C = log2 (1 + γ ), γ is the SNR of the considered
system, and β = 2Rth .
3.1 Partial relay selection
From Eqs. 16 and 19, we have
P {CPRS < Rth} = P {γPRS < β}
= FγPRS (β) , (20)
where
γPRS = min
(
1 + γMξ |hBS|2|hSRk∗ |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 ,
1 + γMξ |hBRk∗ |2|hRk∗D|2
1 + γEξ |hBRk∗ |2|hRk∗E|2
)
. (21)
FγPRS (β) is the CDF of γPRS. From Eq. 20, we have the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The SOP of the considered system in PRS scheme
is formulated as follows:
FγPRS (β) = 1 +
k∑
k=1
l∑
v=0
k(mSR−1)∑
l=0
mRD−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
k
k
)(
l
v
)(
i
j
)
(−1)k(β − 1)l−v+i−j (γEβ)v+j
× w(l, k,mSR)
i!γ l+iM ξ l−v+i−j θ lSRθiRD(mSE)θmSESE (mBS)θmBSBS (mRE)θmRERE (mBR)θmBRBR
×(v + mSE)
(
kβ
θSR
+ 1
θSE
)−(v+mSE)
(v + mRE)
(
βγE
γMθRD
+ 1
θRE
)−(j+mRE)
×2 ×
(
kθBS(β − 1)
θSRγMξ
)mBS−l+v
2 × 2 ×
(
θBR(β − 1)
θRDγMξ
)mBR−i+j
2
KmBS−l+v
(
2
√
k(β − 1)
θSRθBSγMξ
)
×KmBR−i+j
(
2
√
β − 1
θRDθBRγMξ
)
. (22)
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where K1(·) defined in [30, Eq. (3.471.9)] is the modified
Bessel function of the second kind and w(·, ·, ·) function is
derived as
w(l, k,mSR) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
1
l!
)k
, if l = 0
k
l! , if l = 1
1
l
∑l
q=1(qk − l + q) 1q!w(l − q, k,mSR), if 2  l  (mSR − 1)
1
l
∑mSR−1
q=1 (qk − l + q) 1q!w(l − q, k,mSR), if mSR  l < k(mSR − 1)
. (23)
Proof The proof is given in Appendix A.
3.2 Optimal relay selection
From Eqs. 18 and 19, we have
P {CORS < Rth} = P {γORS < β}
= FγORS (β) . (24)
where
γORS = max
k=1,...,K
[
min
(
1 + γMξ |hBS|2|hSRk |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 ,
1 + γMξ |hBRk |2|hRkD|2
1 + γEξ |hBRk |2|hRkE|2
)]
. (25)
FγORS (β) is the CDF of γORS. From Eq. 18, we have the
following Lemma.
Lemma 2 The SOP of optimal relay selection in the con-
sidered system is calculated as follows:
FγORS (β)
= 1 +
K∑
k=1
(
K
k
)
(−1)k
k(mSR−1)∑
i=0
w(i, k,mSR)
×
i∑
n=0
(
i
n
)(
β − 1
γMξθSR
)i−n (
γEβ
γMθSR
)n
×2 ×
(
θBSk(β − 1)
γMξθSR
) n−i+mBS
2
×Kn−i+mBS
(
2
√
k(β − 1)
γMξθSRθBS
)
(n + mSE)(
1
θSE
+ γEβk
γMθSR
)n+mSE
× 1
(mBS)θ
mBS
BS (mSE)θ
mSE
SE
. (26)
Where
 =
[
mRD−1∑
u=0
u∑
v=0
(
u
v
)
1
u!
(β − 1)u−v(γEβ)v
γ uMξ
u−vθuRD
1
(mRE)θ
mRE
RE
1
(mBR)θ
mBR
BR
×(v + mRE)
(
γEβ
γMθRD
+ 1
θRE
)−(v+mRE)
2 ×
( [β − 1]θBR
γMξθRD
) v−u+mBR
2
×Kv−u+mBR
(
2
√
β − 1
γMξθRDθBR
)]k
and
w(i, k,mSR) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if i = 0
k, if i = 1(
1
(mSR−1)!
)k
, if i = k(mSR − 1)
1
i
∑i
t=1 (tk − i + t) 1t !w(i − t, mSR, k), if 2  i  mSR − 1
1
i
∑mSR−1
t=1 (tk − i + t) 1t !w(i − t, mSR, k), if mSR  i  k(mSR − 1).
(27)
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Proof The proof is given in Appendix B.
4 Numerical results
In this section, the simulation results using Monte Carlo
method are provided to validate the accuracy of the above
secrecy outage probability analysis. In this section, the fol-
lowing parameters are fixed: γE=10dB, Rth=0.2 bits/s/Hz,
η=0.8. The parameters of channel links are fixed: mBS=2,
θBS=10, mBR=2, θBR=10, mSR=2, θSR=10, a=2, θRD=10.
The parameters of the eavesdropping links are designed:
mSE=2, θSE=2, mRE=2, θRE=2.
Figure 3 shows the influence of the number of relays on
the secrecy outage probability of PRS and ORS schemes. In
this setup, α=0.01. When K increases, the SOP of the con-
sidered system decreases. ORS has better performance than
PRS scheme because it has more knowledge of CSI of the
considered system than PRS. Besides, the number of relays
has more effect on ORS than on PRS. In fixed γM, ORS ben-
efits from increasing K more than PRS. In addition, in the
high γM region, the SOP for different multiple number of
relays shows little difference compared to PRS scheme.
Figure 4 investigates the effect of energy harvesting time
in a transmission block time on the secrecy outage proba-
bility. In the considered system, k = 3, γM = 10dB. In both
PRS and ORS schemes, the SOP is very large when α is too
small or too high. This is because when the energy harvest-
ing time is too long, S and Rk∗ do not have sufficient time to
forward information and when the transmission duration is
too long, there is little time for the nodes to harvest energy.
In both cases, the SOP will be extremely large. The results
Fig. 3 SOP in ORS and PRS schemes with different number of relays
Fig. 4 SOP in ORS and PRS schemes is plotted as a function of α
also show that the SOP has an optimal point at α=10−2 in
PRS and ORS schemes. Specifically, there is very little dif-
ference in the SOP when α is between 10−2 and 10−1. In
general, α has a significant effect on the performance of the
considered system. Therefore, the EH duration should be
mindfully determined in order to secure the communication.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, a system with multiple DF relays and a power
beacon with single antenna in the presence of an eaves-
dropper has been investigated. Two relay selection schemes
have been proposed in order to enhance the performance
of the considered system. The exact closed-form expres-
sions of SOP have been derived. The results show that
ORS scheme has better performance than PRS. With the
increasing number of relays, the security performance can
be enhanced. Finally, the EH duration has huge impact on
the system performance and should be carefully designed.
In our examples, there is an optimal point at α=10−2.
Appendix A: proof of lemma 1
The SNR of first hop and second hop in PRS scheme can be
written as
γ1PRS = 1 + γMξ |hBS|
2|hSRk∗ |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 , (A.1)
γ2PRS = 1 + γMξ |hBRk∗ |
2|hRk∗D|2
1 + γEξ |hBRk∗ |2|hRk∗E|2
. (A.2)
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The CDF of γ1PRS is expressed as
P {γ1PRS < x}
= 1 +
K∑
k=1
l∑
v=0
k(mSR−1)∑
l=0
(
K
k
)(
v
l
)
(−1)k(x − 1)l−v(ξ)v−l
× (γEx)v (v + mSE)
(mSE)θ
mSE
SE
w(l, k,mSR)
θ lSRγ
l
M
× 1
(mBS)θ
mBS
BS
(
θSRγMθSE
kγExθSE + θSRγM
)v+mSE
×KmBS−l+v
(
2
√
k(x − 1)
θSRθBSγMξ
)
×2 ×
(
k(x − 1)θBS
θSRγMξ
)mBS−l+v
2
. (A.3)
The CDF of γ2PRS is expressed as
P {γ2PRS < x}
= 1 −
mRD−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
1
i!
(x − 1)i−j (γEx)j
γ iMξ
i−j θ iRD
× (v + mRE)
(mRE)θ
mRE
RE (mBR)θ
mBR
BR
(
xγE
γMθRD
+ 1
θRE
)−(v+mRE)
×KmBR−i+j
(
2
√
x − 1
θRDθBRγMξ
)
× 2
×
(
θBR(x − 1)
θRDγMξ
)mBR−i+j
2
. (A.4)
The SOP of the considered system in PRS scheme is
formulated as follows
FγPRS (β) = 1 −
[
(1 − Fγ1PRS (β))(1 − Fγ2PRS (β))
] (A.5)
After performing some mathematical manipulations, Eq. 22
can be achieved with the help of [30, Eq. (3.471.9)].
Appendix B: proof of lemma 2
In ORS scheme, the SNR of the first and second hop can be
derived as
γ1ORS = 1 + γMξ |hBS|
2|hSRk |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 ,
γ2ORS = 1 + γMξ |hBRk |
2|hRkD|2
1 + γEξ |hBRk |2|hRkE|2
. (B.1)
We denote that Yo = |hBS|2, and Zo = |hSE|2. The SOP
of the considered system in the ORS scheme is calculated
as follows
FγORS (x) =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
[
1 − (1 − Fγ1ORS|Yo,Zo (x))
×(1−Fγ2ORS (x))
]K
fYo (y) fZo (z) dy dz. (B.2)
Where in the first hop
Fγ1ORS|Yo,Zo (x)
= P
{
1 + γMξ |hBS|2|hSRk |2
1 + γEξ |hBS|2|hSE|2 < x
}
= P
{
|hSRk |2 <
(1 + γEξYoZo)x − 1
γMξYo
}
= 1 − exp
(
−[1 + γEξYoZo]x − 1
γMξYoθSR
) mSR−1∑
i=0
1
i!
×
( [1 + γEξYoZo]x − 1
γMξYoθSR
)i
. (B.3)
Where in the second hop
Fγ2ORS (x)
= 1 −
mRD−1∑
u=0
u∑
v=0
(
u
v
)
1
u!
(x − 1)u−v(γEx)v
γ uMξ
u−vθuRD
× 1
(mRE)θ
mRE
RE
(v + mRE)
(
γEx
γMθRD
+ 1
θRE
)−(v+mRE)
×2 ×
( [x − 1]θBR
γMξθRD
) v−u+mBR
2 1
(mBR)θ
mBR
BR
Kv−u+mBR
×
(
2
√
x − 1
γMξθRDθBR
)
. (B.4)
After performing some mathematical manipulations, Eq. 26
can be achieved with the help of [30, Eq. (3.471.9)].
References
1. Yuen C, Elkashlan M, Qian Y, Duong TQ, Shu L, Schmidt F
(2015) Energy harvesting communications: part 1 [Guest Edito-
rial]. IEEE Commun Mag 53(6):54–55
2. Yuen C, Elkashlan M, Qian Y, Duong TQ, Shu L, Schmidt F
(2015) Energy harvesting communications: part 2 [Guest Edito-
rial]. IEEE Commun Mag 53(6):54–55
3. Yuen C, Elkashlan M, Qian Y, Duong TQ, Shu L, Schmidt F
(2015) Energy harvesting communications: part 3 [Guest Edito-
rial]. IEEE Commun Mag 53(6):54–55
4. Zhou X, Zhang R, Ho CK (2013) Wireless information and power
transfer: architecture design and rate-energy tradeoff. IEEE Trans
Commun 61(11):4754–4767
FO
R A
PP
RO
VA
L
Mobile Netw Appl
5. Nasir AA, Zhou X, Durrani S, Kennedy RA (2013) Relaying pro-
tocols for wireless energy harvesting and information processing.
IEEE Trans Wireless Commun 12(7):3622–3636
6. Nasir AA, Zhou X, Durrani S, Kennedy RA (2015) Wireless-
powered relays in cooperative communications: time-switching
relaying protocols and throughput analysis. IEEE Trans Commun
63(5):1607–1622
7. Michalopoulos DS, Suraweera HA, Schober R (2015) Relay
selection for simultaneous information transmission and wireless
energy transfer: a tradeoff perspective. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun
33(8):1–1
8. Mohammadi M, Chalise BK, Suraweera HA, Zhong C, Zheng
G, Krikidis I (2016) Throughput analysis and optimization of
wireless-powered multiple antenna full-duplex relay systems.
IEEE Trans Commun 64(4):1769–1785
9. Zhong C, Zheng G, Zhang Z, Karagiannidis G (2015) Optimum
wirelessly powered relaying. IEEE Signal Process Lett 22(10):1–1
10. Nguyen V-D, Duong TQ, Tuan HD, Shin O-S, Poor HV (2017)
Spectral and energy efficiencies in full-duplex wireless informa-
tion and power transfer. IEEE Trans Commun 65(5):2220–2233
11. Rankov B, Wittneben A (2007) Spectral efficient protocols for
half-duplex fading relay channels. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun
25(2):379–389
12. Bao VNQ, Duong TQ, da Costa DB, Alexandropoulos GC, Nal-
lanathan A (2013) Cognitive amplify-and-forward relaying with
best relay selection in non-identical Rayleigh fading. IEEE Com-
mun Lett 17(3):475–478
13. Chen G, Tian Z, Gong Y, Chambers J (2014) Decode-and-forward
buffer-aided relay selection in cognitive relay networks. IEEE
Trans Veh Technol 63(9):4723–4728
14. Hoang TM, Duong TQ, Vo NS, Kundu C (2017) Physical layer
security in cooperative energy harvesting networks with a friendly
jammer. IEEE Wireless Commun Lett PP(99):1–1
15. Fan L, Lei X, Yang N, Duong TQ, Karagiannidis GK (2017)
Secrecy cooperative networks with outdated relay selection over
correlated fading channels. IEEE Trans Veh Technol PP(99):1–1
16. Yang M, Guo D, Huang Y, Duong TQ, Zhang B (2016) Secure
multiuser scheduling in downlink dual-hop regenerative relay net-
works over Nakagami- m fading channels. IEEE Trans Wireless
Commun 15(12):8009–8024
17. Fan L, Lei X, Yang N, Duong TQ, Karagiannidis GK (2016)
Secure multiple amplify-and-forward relaying with cochannel
interference. IEEE J Sel Topics Signal Process 10(8):1494–1505
18. Duong TQ, Hoang TM, Kundu C, Elkashlan M, Nallanathan A
(2016) Optimal power allocation for multiuser secure communi-
cation in cooperative relaying networks. IEEE Wireless Commun
Lett 5(5):516–519
19. Huang Y, Wang J, Zhong C, Duong TQ, Karagiannidis GK (2016)
Secure transmission in cooperative relaying networks with multi-
ple antennas. IEEE Trans Wireless Commun 15(10):6843–6856
20. Nguyen NP, Duong TQ, Ngo HQ, Hadzi-Velkov Z, Shu L (2016)
Secure 5G wireless communications: a joint relay selection and
wireless power transfer approach. IEEE Access 4:3349–3359
21. Fan L, Yang N, Duong TQ, Elkashlan M, Karagiannidis GK
(2016) Exploiting direct links for physical layer security in
multiuser multirelay networks. IEEE Trans Wireless Commun
15(6):3856–3867
22. Hoang TM, Duong TQ, Suraweera HA, Tellambura C, Poor HV
(2015) Cooperative beamforming and user selection for improving
the security of relay-aided systems. IEEE Trans Wireless Commun
63(12):5039–5051
23. Rodriguez LJ, Tran NH, Duong TQ, Le-Ngoc T, Elkashlan M,
Shetty S (2015) Physical layer security in wireless cooperative
relay networks: atate of the art and beyond. IEEE Commun Mag
53(12):32–39
24. Wang L, Kim KJ, Duong TQ, Elkashlan M, Poor HV (2015)
Security enhancement of cooperative single carrier systems. IEEE
Trans Inf Forensics Secur 10(1):90–103
25. Fan L, Lei X, Duong TQ, Elkashlan M, Karagiannidis GK
(2014) Secure multiuser communications in multiple amplify-
and-forward relay networks. IEEE Trans Commun 62(9):3299–
3310
26. Wang L, Elkashlan M, Huang J, Tran NH, Duong TQ (2014)
Secure transmission with optimal power allocation in untrusted
relay networks. IEEE Wireless Commun Lett 3(3):289–292
27. Ng DWK, Lo ES, Schober R (2014) Robust beamforming for
secure communication in systems with wireless information and
power transfer. IEEE Trans Wireless Commun 13(8):4599–4615
28. Liu W, Zhou X, Durrani S, Popovski P (2016) Secure commu-
nication with a wireless-powered friendly jammer. IEEE Trans
Wireless Commun 15(1):401–415
29. Zhang J, Nguyen N-P, Zhang J, Garcia-Palacios E, Le NP (2016)
Impact of primary networks on the performance of energy harvest-
ing cognitive radio networks. IET Commun 10(18):2559–2566
30. Gradshteyn IS, Ryzhik IM (2007) Table of integrals, series, and
products, 7th edn. Academic Press, San Diego
